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Abstract
While parties in many new democracies frequently split, merge, change labels, and
make and break electoral alliances, comparative systematic research on how these
changes are related to each other is limited. This study addresses this gap by con-
ceptualizing change as a result of intra-party conflicts, conflicts in or consolidation of
existing electoral alliances, and the formation of new alliances and mergers. We de-
velop measures for each type of change using an original dataset that covers almost 800
party-electoral term dyads in 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the period
between 1990 and 2015. Our findings contradict the idea of party change as a uni-
dimensional phenomenon. Instead we find that exits from existing electoral alliances,
their consolidation through mergers, and the formation of new alliances and mergers
are moderately related to each other, but not with intra-party splits. Thus, parties and
their alliances structure political competition in Central and Eastern Europe relatively
well. Our findings also suggest that negative consequences of party change on repre-
sentation and accountability are limited, as under the relative absence of multiple and
nearly simultaneous changes in party identity the electorate should be able to follow
party evolution.
Wordcount: 8079.
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Introduction
Political parties and party systems are crucial institutions for the functioning of a modern
representative democracy. Among other functions, political parties aggregate and represent
various interests in policy-making and ensure the accountability of democratic government
to voters. The ability of parties to fulfil these functions varies across democracies and time
periods though. The literature on third wave democracies, in particular, has called into
question parties’ ability to assure voter representation, electoral accountability and effective
governance. One of the key weaknesses of parties in young democracies is their instability.
The change in party alternatives occurs in various ways: parties do not simply only enter
and exit electoral competition, but they also split, merge, and form and dissolve electoral
coalitions.1 These complex changes of identity have important consequences on democracy:
they may change the levels of party system fragmentation, undermine voters’ representation
by confusing them about parties’ policy positions, impede the formation of stable partisan
identities, and prevent voters from holding parties accountable.2 Consequently, the litera-
ture has recently made an important effort in conceptualizing these types of party change
and analyzing their patterns, causes, and consequences (Casal-Bertoa, Deegan-Krause and
Haughton, 2015; Ceron, 2015b; Golder, 2006; Ibenskas, 2016a; Kaminski, 2001; Litton, 2015;
Marinova, 2015).
However, an important gap in this scholarship, addressed by the present study, concerns
the lack of theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between different types of
party instability. Parties may split, merge, or form and dissolve alliances (nearly) simulta-
neously. Alternatively, each of these types of party change may occur in isolation from the
others. Implications for democracy are substantively different depending on which pattern
prevails. Specifically, if different party transformations occur in the same electoral period or
1In this study, “electoral coalitions” and “electoral alliances” are used interchangeably to refer to joint
candidate lists in national elections, as discussed in the section on data and measurement.
2Other consequences may be more positive: for example, electoral coalitions and mergers may reduce the
share of wasted vote and increase the clarity of government alternatives to the electorate.
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in close temporal proximity, party alternatives would change almost unrecognizably between
elections, and voters would find it very challenging to learn about parties’ policy positions
and therefore vote according to their policy preferences. Similarly, such complex transforma-
tions of party identity would decrease voters’ ability to punish government parties for poor
performance and/or to identify credible alternatives among the parties in opposition. In
contrast, representation and accountability are less likely to be undermined if parties do not
experience multiple transformations of different types simultaneously. As the basic contours
of the party system remain unchanged between elections, the electorate is more likely to
keep track of party evolution.
The relationship between different types of party transformations also has important im-
plications on how we understand political competition in new democracies.3 This is because
some of these changes, especially party splits, are a result of intra-party conflicts. The for-
mation and dissolution of electoral alliances and mergers on other hand is largely an outcome
of inter-party competition and cooperation. If we observe that these different types of party
change tend to occur together, it would suggest that parties’ ability to structure political
competition is low. Party boundaries can be easily crossed by individual politicians or their
groups, which suggests that they rather than parties are the main building blocks of political
competition (Birch, 2003; Rakner, Svasand and Khembo, 2007).
An additional complexity is that many formations in young democracies, while formally
electoral alliances or blocs, in fact can also be considered as parties due to relatively high
levels of their institutionalization. Indeed, major cross-national comparative databases on
political parties, such as the Chapel Hill expert survey on parties’ positions (Bakker et al.,
2015) or the Manifesto Project database, include multiple electoral alliances. Several exam-
ples are the Coalition for Bulgaria and the Union of Democratic Forces (which was a coalition
until the mid-1990s) in Bulgaria, the Unity coalition and the Union of Greens and Farmers
in Latvia, the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Left and Democrats in Poland, and the
3Our approach here is related but distinct from Franzmann (2011), who conceptualizes party competition
as interactions that include both cooperation and contestation.
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Slovak Democratic Coalition in Slovakia. The present study sheds light on the stability,
longevity and, more generally, “partyness” of such alliances.
To address this complexity of party competition in young democracies, we focus on the
change in party identities as a result of conflicts and cooperation at three levels: intra-
party, intra-coalition, and inter-party. Specifically, at the intra-party level, we examine the
presence (absence) of party splits as an indication of a conflict (cooperation) between various
actors in the party. At the coalitional level, we conceptualize conflict as the dissolution of
existing alliances, and the persistence of cooperation as the survival of these alliances or
their consolidation through full-blown party mergers. Finally, we capture the formation of
cooperation arrangements by previous competitors as the creation of alliances and merged
parties by the parties that previously did not cooperate in electoral coalitions.
We measure these patterns of conflict and cooperation by drawing on a new database
on party change (designed specifically for this study) in 11 countries in Central and Eastern
Europe in 73 electoral terms in the period between 1990 and 2015. The dataset considers
parties with at least 1 percent of the vote, and the total number of party-electoral term
dyads is almost 800. This substantial data collection effort provides an important empirical
contribution to understanding the development of parties and party systems in Central and
Eastern Europe.
In the next section, we discuss the linkage between intra-party, intra-coalitional, and
inter-party conflict and cooperation in new democracies, and the ways in which party change
helps us to understand this link. We then address the measurement issues. The final two
sections discuss the results of the analysis and their implications.
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Intra-party and inter-party conflict and cooperation in
new democracies
The study of intra-party politics is a diverse and rapidly developing field of research
that includes a number of theoretical perspectives and empirical approaches (Giannetti and
Benoit, 2009). This variety is a result of the importance and complexity of contemporary
political parties, in which internal party disagreements and tensions may arise for a variety
of reasons and at different levels of party organization. What these multiple streams of
research share however is their focus on the level of the heterogeneity of the behaviour
and preferences of internal party actors, both individuals, such as legislators, activists and
rank-and-file members, and collective ones, such as factions and tendencies.
One important reason why internal party politics should be studied is that it affects
whether these various actors remain in the party. Indeed, exit (Hirschman, 1970) is an
extreme form of internal party disunity. It can take various forms, including the defection of
legislators to other parties (Ceron, 2015a; Desposato, 2006; Laver and Benoit, 2003; Mershon,
2014) and the formal withdrawal of activists from the party (Ko¨lln and Polk, 2015; Scarrow,
2015). This research complements these important and relevant approaches by focusing
on the defection of intra-party factions, groups or individual politicians that lead to the
emergence of new parties. Such party splits (also referred to as fission and breakaways in
this study) are important because they may change the dynamics in the party system by
leading to the emergence of a successful splinter party and/or the electoral collapse of a
parent party (Hug, 2001; Ibenskas, 2014b). Furthermore, splits of government parties also
threaten government stability (Ceron, 2015b).
So far, most advanced theoretical and empirical work on party splits has focused on
established democracies (Ceron, 2015b; Giannetti and Laver, 2001). However, party fission
has long been identified as an important characteristic of parties and party systems in young
democracies (Lewis, 2000; Millard, 2004; Olson, 1998; Rose and Munro, 2003; Sikk, 2005;
5
Spirova, 2007; Szczerbiak, 2001), and there is evidence to suggest that they are indeed
on average more prevalent in these countries in comparison to older Western democracies
(Ibenskas, 2014b; Marinova, 2015).
A systematic study of party fission in young democracies is challenging though. This is
not only because the fluidity of parties in many of these countries creates substantial data
collection problems, but also because the concept of party itself is less well established. One
issue is that many so-called parties are actually electoral alliances or blocs that consist of
multiple parties and other groups. Although such blocs exist in older democracies as well,
as the analysis of the German Christian Democrats by Greene and Haber (2015) in this
special issue demonstrates, these blocs tend to be rare and they have well-defined and stable
memberships. In contrast, electoral alliances and blocs are an important feature of party
landscape in almost every new democracy. For example, Ibenskas (2016b) finds that on
average 1.8 joint candidate lists competed in an election in Central and Eastern European
countries. These alliances also vary greatly in terms of their stability and institutionaliza-
tion. While some are dissolved after elections (Millard, 2004), others have persisted for a
long time (e.g. the coalition between Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian
Democratic Party in Hungary or the Green and Farmers’ Union in Latvia) or developed in-
tricate procedures and rules of cooperation (e.g. the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria,
the Democratic Convention in Romania, and the Solidarity Electoral Action in Poland in
the 1990s). Given the longevity and institutionalization of these alliances, their termination
by constituent parties may be considered (and have been considered in the literature) as
party splits. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that some of these intra-coalitional
conflicts overlap with splits of their constituent parties, which would require a systematic
study of party fission to consider both intra-party and intra-coalitional levels.4 However,
more systematic evidence on the relationship between party and coalition stability is not
4For example, the dissolution of the ethnic Russian alliance For Human Rights in a United Latvia
(PCTVL) in 2003-2004 was followed by the splits of two of these parties, leading to the formation of a
splinter party.
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available in the literature.
An additional complication arises because many observers of the politics of new or young
democracies consider splits of parties or dissolutions of alliances as being intrinsically related
to the formation of new alliances or permanent party mergers (Mair, 1997). According to
this view, in the context of limited ideological structuration of party competition, weak voter
partisanship, and low party institutionalization, parties or their alliances are just temporary
and expedient formations, and as such are of minor importance in understanding political
competition. Instead, individual politicians are the main building blocs of political com-
petition in this “floating party system” (Birch, 2003; Millard, 2004; Rose and Shin, 2001;
Szczerbiak, 2001). The party landscape can therefore be easily transformed through the
dissolution of existing parties and alliances and the formation of new coalitions and merged
parties if these re-combinations help individual politicians to reach office (Rakner, Svasand
and Khembo, 2007).
While the “floating party system” view quite precisely describes political competition
in many democracies in Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia and Eastern Europe, it is
more controversial with regard to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. One the one
hand, it has been challenged by a number of studies that find quite stable and structured
party competition in most Central and Eastern European countries following the chaotic
decade of the 1990s (Bakke, 2010). Many states in the region have adopted party regulation
(Casal Be´rtoa and van Biezen, 2014) that limited the participation of non-party actors
(for example, social movements or trade unions) in elections, thus eliminating some fuzzy
alliances and groups. Furthermore, party competition based on ideological grounds has
emerged (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012; Rovny and Polk, 2015)
and at least some parties established relatively strong party organizations (Gherghina, 2014;
Ibenskas, 2014a; Tavits, 2013). On the other hand, the strength of membership organizations
remains weaker in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (Van Biezen, Mair
and Poguntke, 2012), the level of party organizational change is higher (Marinova, 2015), and
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all countries in the region continue to experience high levels of new party entry, including
the emergence of centrist parties with fuzzy ideologies (B˚agenholm, 2013; Hanley and Sikk,
2014; Pop-Eleches, 2010; Sikk, 2012).
This research makes a contribution to this debate on the strength of parties in new
democracies by focusing on the extent to which conflicts and cooperation at three levels
(intra-party, coalition, and party systemic) overlap. Specifically, at the intra-party level, we
examine the presence (absence) of fission as an indication of a conflict (cooperation) between
various groups in the party. At the intra-coalitional level, we conceptualize conflict as the
dissolution of existing alliances, and the persistence of cooperation as the continuation of
these alliances or their consolidation through full-blown party mergers. Finally, we capture
the formation of cooperation arrangements by previous competitors as the creation of new
alliances and merged parties by the parties that previously did not cooperate in electoral
coalitions.
According to the approach that emphasizes high instability of parties and party systems
in Central and Eastern Europe, the patterns of cooperation and conflict should substan-
tially overlap at all three levels, thus making intra- and inter-party cooperation and conflict
indistinguishable. This approach suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Intra-party and intra-coalitional conflict and inter-party cooperation are
likely to co-occur.
If, however, parties in Central and Eastern Europe are relatively strong institutions, the
patterns of conflict and cooperation at the intra-party, coalitional and party system levels,
while more frequent than in most Western democracies, should occur independently from
each other. This forms an alternative hypothesis of the present research.
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Data and measurement
We analyse party change in 11 current EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe
from the first democratic elections until 2015.5 Our unit of observation is party-in-electoral
term (between t and t+1 ), but we also examine the relationship between different types of
change in individual parties across several elections.
As we are interested in patterns of intra- and inter-party conflict and cooperation, we
only include parties that persisted throughout the term. This includes parties that joined an
electoral alliance or underwent a merger, but excludes new parties and those that disappeared
from electoral scene. We include all parties that received at least one percent of the vote
in t, regardless of their support in t+1. Hence, we include parties that lost most of their
support in t+1, but were relevant in t - a fairly common occurrence in Central and Eastern
Europe. In total, we study 796 parties-in-electoral-term in 73 electoral terms.6
To capture conflict and cooperation at intra-party, intra-coalition, and inter-party level,
we identify six types of party change: split, exit from an electoral coalition, exit label change,
the consolidation of an electoral alliance through a merger, entry into a new electoral coalition
or merger and entry label change. We use the term electoral coalitions (interchangeably with
alliances) for joint candidate lists, excluding weaker forms of electoral cooperation, such as
public commitments to govern together (Golder, 2006), where parties give up very little
autonomy. Most countries included in our study used PR or mixed electoral systems. For
the only election in which a majoritarian system was used (Croatia 1990), electoral coalition
is defined as joint candidates in single-member districts.
5We exclude the 1990 elections in the Baltic states that were still part of the Soviet Union and politics
there was more clearly dominated by the confrontation between democratic movements and communist
parties than in other founding elections. Also, we only have incomplete data for these elections.
6We only consider elections to the lower chamber. The estimated vote share of parties in electoral
coalitions is the product of (a) the coalition’s vote share and (b) the proportion of coalition’s seats won the
party. For coalitions with no seats, we assume equal votes for constituent parties.
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Intra-party conflict
We define split as the foundation of a new party (splinter party) by politician(s) formerly
affiliated with another party. We only include splits after which the splinter party contested
an election independently or as part of an electoral coalition, thus excluding switching of
individual members or splinter factions between parties. In total, we record 154 cases of
splits, affecting 19 percent of all party-electoral term dyads.
Intra-coalition conflict and cooperation
Intra-coalition conflict and cooperation takes three forms: exit from an electoral coalition,
exit label change and merger. An exit from coalition entails that a party no longer shares an
alliance with at least one of its coalition partners in previous election. For two-party alliances
this means that the parties compete independently or in different coalitions. For alliances of
more than two parties, an exit is coded if at least one of these parties leaves the alliance by
the next election. We recorded 188 exits, affecting 24 percent of parties-in-electoral-term.
While exit from coalition focusses on changes in coalition membership, exit label change
contrasts party labels (registered names) with their electoral labels (incl. coalition names).
Party label change has not been extensively studied (but see Kim and Solt (2015)), but
electoral label change in Central and Eastern Europe appears to be closely related to intra-
coalition conflict. Alliances seldom use names of their constituent parties - Civic Platform
(Poland 2001) was a rare exception as it was effectively an alliance, including candidates of
the Conservative People’s Party. More often, they combine names of its constituent parties
(e.g. “Working for Lithuania: Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and New Union” in 2004)
or adopt a unique name (e.g. “Unity” in Latvia 2012, composed of New Era, Civic Union
and Society for Different Politics). In such cases, as parties move in and out of electoral
coalitions, their electoral labels change.
Exit label change can be seen as a different form of exit from an electoral alliance, when:
(1) party’s electoral label changes between elections but (2) its electoral label in t does not
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match the party label in t and t+1. The logic behind the coding is the following. First, if
party label differs from its electoral label, it must have been part of an electoral alliance - e.g.
none of the parties in “Working for Lithuania” or “Unity” shared a label with the coalition.
Second, if electoral label changes between elections, the party must have left the alliance,
either to compete in elections alone or in alliance with other parties. For example, the
Lithuanian Social Democrats and the New Union competed under their own labels in 2008,
after forming a coalition in 2004. Still, party’s electoral label may also change if members
of an alliance merge, adopting its label - e.g. the members of “Unity” merged into a single
party (also called “Unity”) before the next election. Such cases, where the party label in
t+1 matched its electoral label in t, are not coded as exits. We recorded 195 of exit label
changes in our dataset.7
While exit from a coalition and exit label change reflect intra-coalition conflict, a merger
represents consolidation. We define it as a merger of two or more parties that in previ-
ous election were joint members of an electoral alliance. We record 74 cases of a party
participating in such a merger, affecting 9 percent of our sample.
Inter-party cooperation
Inter-party cooperation occurs if during an electoral period a party forms a new electoral
alliance or a merged party.8 We define an electoral coalition as new in t+1, if it includes at
least one party that did not coalesce with other parties in t. Similarly, a new merger involves
at least one party that was not in electoral coalition with other constituent parties in the
7This rule complements changes in alliance membership in two ways. First, it does not consider as exits
cases where a party that leaves an alliance is too insignificant for the coalition to change its label. For
example, the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces retained the label between the 1991 and 1994 elections,
even though it lost some of its constituent parties. Second, we can capture cases when a party was a member
of an electoral alliance that included formations and individuals insufficiently organized to be considered
parties or too small to be included in the dataset. For example, in 1992, the Czech Communist party
formed a “Left Bloc” with a minuscule “Democratic Left”, but reverted to its own party label by the 1996
parliamentary election. The change in its electoral label reflects a change in coalitional affiliation, which
would otherwise go unnoticed, as “Democratic Left” had too low support to be included in the dataset.
8A more nuanced analysis would consider mergers and new coalitions separately, but we combine them
here because our main goal is to capture all new forms of inter-party cooperation.
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preceding election. Thus, we exclude from the definition merged parties strictly based on
electoral alliances in the preceding election. If more than two parties form an alliance or
merge before an election, then at least one of them must have contested the previous election
independently or in a different alliance than other constituent parties of the coalition or
merger. In total, we recorded 324 new coalition entries or mergers.
New inter-party cooperation can also take the form of entry label change. As discussed
above, changes in electoral labels provide an alternative way to identify the formation of new
coalitions to directly tracking alliance membership. Entry label change occurs if: (1) party’s
label at the time of election t+1 does not match its electoral label, and (2) its electoral
label has changed between elections. The first condition implies that the party contested
election in t+1 as part of an alliance. The second condition implies that in t the party
either ran independently or under a different alliance label than its electoral label in t+1. In
combination, they indicate that the party either joined a new coalition or switched coalitions
during an electoral term.9 The total number of entry label changes was 274.
Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we analyze the co-occurrence of six
types of party change within a single electoral term. Second, we focus on how they correlate
at the level of individual party. Third, we interpret and contextualize these patterns by
emphasizing the effects of three factors suggested in the literature - party size, the age of
democracy, and electoral institutions.
9It is also possible that the alliance label changed between elections, while the party remained its member.
We argue that such a change in alliance label indicates a substantive change and such an alliance ought to
be seen as new.
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Conflict and cooperation within a single legislative term
We first examine the distribution of the number of changes for each party-in-electoral
term in our sample (Figure 1). On average, a party experiences 1.5 change events in an
electoral term. The distribution is skewed to the right with the median number of events
being 1.0. Thus, almost a half of observations in the sample are characterized by more than
one event. Close to 25 percent experienced more than two events of change.
Figure 1: Frequency of party change
Note: Frequency of change per party includes only the parties that met the selection criteria
for at least two electoral terms.
Table 1 flashes out the patterns of the relationship between individual forms of change
through pairwise correlation coefficients. Unsurprisingly, given that they capture the same
theoretical concepts, the relationship between entries into electoral coalitions and entry label
changes and between exits from coalitions and exit label changes is strongest: correlation
coefficients exceed 0.8 in both cases. The association between intra-coalitional conflict and
new inter-party cooperation is moderately strong. The pairwise correlations between the
13
variables that capture entry and entry label change and exit and exit label range between 0.3
and 0.5. Furthermore, there is only a weak relationship between intra-coalitional cooperation
(mergers) on the one hand and intra-coalitional conflict and inter-party cooperation on the
other hand (correlation coefficients vary between 0.15 and 0.3). Finally, the correlation
between party fission and the remaining five variables is particularly low, with none of the
coefficients exceeding 0.1.
Table 1: Conflict and cooperation within a single legislative term: tetrachoric correlation
coefficients
Variable Split Merger Exit Exit Entry Entry
label label
Split 1.00
Merger -0.04 1.00
Exit -0.04 0.23 1.00
Exit label -0.07 0.31 0.87 1.00
Entry 0.02 0.17 0.44 0.30 1.00
Entry label 0.04 0.17 0.31 0.49 0.81 1.00
We find similar patterns in the exploratory factor analysis of change (see Table 2). Two
factors are extracted based on the scree plot. The first factor is most related to the forms
of change that represent inter-party cooperation, namely, the entry into a new coalition
or merger and entry label change. Intra-coalitional conflict and cooperation also load on
this factor, but only weakly. Conversely, the second factor represents exits from existing
coalitions, as it is strongly related to exits from electoral alliances and exit label changes,
but entry label change and mergers are also somewhat associated with this factor. The
loadings of splits on either of these factors is low.
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) allows us to uncover the dimensionality of our
data more fully. We interpret the first four dimensions from the MCA solution. They have
eigen values of 0.36, 0.20, 0.17 and 0.16, meaning that they all either exceed or are very
close to the threshold of 0.167 that establishes whether an axis is sufficiently important to
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Table 2: Conflict and cooperation within a single legislative term: exploratory factor analysis
of tetrachoric correlation matrix (varimax rotation)
Variable 1 2
Split 0.02 -0.08
Merger 0.16 0.28
Exit 0.41 0.78
Label exit 0.27 0.96
Entry 1.00 0.03
Label entry 0.80 0.27
Initial eigenvalues 2.70 1.20
Extraction method: maximum likelihood.
be interpreted.10 In contrast, the fifth factor has an eigen value of only 0.08.
The results of MCA are summarized in Figure 2, which presents, in two separate plots,
the coordinates of each of the 12 variable categories (i.e. dichotomous categories for the
presence or absence of six variables of party change) on all four dimensions.11 The first
two dimensions capture the exit from existing alliances (Dimension 1) and the formation
of new coalitions and merged parties (Dimension 2). Thus, on the first dimension (x axis
in Figure 2), the scores of the categories that indicate the exit from alliances have high
positive values (above 1) while the categories that measure the absence of the termination of
alliances have relatively high negative values. The scores of all other variable categories on
this dimension are close to 0. Similarly, the second dimension (y axis in Figure 2) contrasts
the categories that indicate the participation of the party in a new electoral coalition or
merged party and the absence of such cooperation.
The remaining two dimensions can be easily interpreted as the presence of intra-party
conflict, as captured by party fission (Dimension 3), and the consolidation of an existing
alliance through a merger (Dimension 4). No other categories have high scores on these two
axes of the MCA solution. This confirms the findings in Table 1 about the low correlation
10Greenacre (2007, 140) recommends to interpret dimensions with eigen values above the ratio between 1
and the number of variables, which is 6 in the present analysis.
11To increase the interpretability of the results, we apply varimax rotation to the original MCA solution.
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Figure 2: Patterns of intra-party, coalitional and party-systemic conflict and cooperation:
Multiple Correspondence Analysis
Note: 0 indicates the absence of a specific type of change and 1 indicates its presence.
Abbreviations of country names indicate the location of the categories of the supplementary
country variable. Varimax rotation as implemented in the “PCAmixdata” package of the
statistical environment R was applied to the original MCA solution (Chavent et al., 2014).
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of these two variables with the remaining measures of party change.
Overall, the evidence suggests that forms of change occur largely independently from
each other. This evidence contradicts Hypothesis 1, which proposed the uni-dimensional
pattern of change.
Conflict and cooperation across legislative terms
While the previous sub-section suggests that intra-party conflict, intra-coalitional conflict
and cooperation and new inter-party cooperation is unlikely to occur in a single term, it is
possible that individual parties experience these changes at different points in their lifetime.
To aggregate our data at the party level, we compute the share of electoral terms (from the
total number of periods in which the party was present) in which the party experienced each
form of change. In this analysis we exclude all parties that entered our sample only once
because their electoral support and institutionalization is substantially lower than that of
their more persistent competitors. Given the high number of these short-lived parties (145
or 45% of the total), their inclusion in the analysis could severely bias our results.
Table 3: Conflict and cooperation across multiple legislative terms: Pearson correlation
coefficients
Variable Split Merger Exit Exit Entry Entry
label label
Split 1.00
Merger -0.12 1.00
Exit -0.07 0.18 1.00
Exit label -0.06 0.10 0.72 1.00
Entry -0.01 0.37 0.69 0.52 1.00
Entry label 0.00 0.17 0.59 0.67 0.68 1.00
Looking at the remaining 179 parties, we find that the average number of change events
per party (5.1) is higher than that per party-in-electoral-term (Figure 1). The overwhelming
majority of parties (92%) experienced at least one change event in their lifetimes. The
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median is 4 events. A non-negligible number of parties experienced more than 10 events.
Two parties in Croatia (the Peasant Party and the People’s Party) had the highest number
of events (19 each) - on average, more than 3 events per electoral term.
Table 3 also indicates a somewhat stronger relationship between different forms of change
than reported in the previous sub-section. Specifically, pairwise correlations between exit,
exit label change, entry and entry label are are all relatively strong. However, the association
between intra-coalitional cooperation (mergers) on the one hand and intra-coalitional conflict
and inter-party cooperation on the other hand is weak with the exception of the moderate
correlation between entry and mergers. Also, intra-party conflict does not correlate much
with any other forms of change in line with the results in Table 1.
Table 4: Conflict and cooperation across multiple legislative terms: exploratory factor anal-
ysis (varimax rotation)
1-dimension 2-dimensions
Variable 1 1 2
Split -0.05 0.01 -0.06
Merger 0.26 0.39 -0.02
Exit 0.84 0.57 0.58
Label exit 0.79 0.31 0.95
Entry 0.79 0.97 0.23
Label entry 0.78 0.57 0.52
Initial eigenvalues 2.65 1.84 1.56
Extraction method: maximum likelihood.
Exploratory factor analysis (Table 4) suggests that change across terms is charaterized
by either one or two dimensions. In the one-dimensional solution, intra-coalitional conflict
and new inter-party cooperation load highly on the extracted factor, mergers are associated
with it weakly, and splits barely at all. In the two-dimensional solution, the first factor
captures new inter-party cooperation and, to a lower extent, intra-coalitional conflict and
cooperation. The second factor is associated with intra-coalitional conflict and one of the
variables of new inter-party cooperation (entry label change). Splits do not load on any of
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these factors.
The uncovered relationship between inter-party cooperation on the one hand and intra-
coalitional conflict and, less so, cooperation at the level of individual party is partially
expected. Parties by definition need to enter coalitions before they can exit or consolidate
them through mergers. Still, the strength of these relationships suggest that most electoral
coalitions are either dissolved or lead to mergers. Specifically, from the total number of
parties that were in our sample at least twice, 82 or 46% experienced at least one entry and
one exit. Looking at the parties with at least one entry (138 parties or 77% of the total
number), 59% exited alliances at least once. The shares of parties with at least one entry
and one consolidation of coalition through a merger are 23% of the total number of parties
and 30% of the parties that had one or more entries. The shares of parties with entry(-ies)
only are also 23% and 30%, but these entries are mostly new mergers that were not preceded
by coalitions. Thus, the evidence indicates that electoral alliances either provide the means
for achieving short-term electoral goals or serve as stepping stones for mergers.
These findings on the relationship between intra-coalitional and inter-party cooperation
and conflict support Hypothesis 1. However, low correlation between exit and mergers and
especially between splits and all other forms of change contradict it.12 Thus, change can still
be seen a multi-dimensional phenomenon that includes one or two loose dimensions of intra-
coalitional conflict and cooperation and inter-party cooperation, and a separate dimension
of intra-party conflict.
Understanding party change
The existence of the multi-dimensional pattern of change suggests that the explanations
of its individual forms are different. We view the substantiation of this argument through
the development of elaborate theoretical frameworks and systematic empirical analyses of
12We also note that the correlation between splits and all other forms of change persists when analyzing
parties in each country separately. In all but four cases the absolute value of the coefficients of the correlation
between fission and the other types of change are below 0.4.
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each form of change as a challenge to the future research that due to space constraints can
not be addressed here. In this sub-section we instead examine the correlations between
change and several explanatory factors (Table 5) and country-specific patterns (Figure 3).
Specifically, we examine the effect of party size because the literature on electoral coalitions
and mergers (Golder, 2006; Ibenskas, 2016b,a) indicates that electorally vulnerable parties
are more likely to coalesce with other parties. The second factor is closed-list electoral
system. According to Ceron (2015b), it encourages splits by preventing rebellious politicians
or factions from building independent electoral base in their parent parties. At the same
time, Ibenskas (2016b) argues that parties find it easier to reach agreements under closed-list
systems because voters cannot disrupt the ranking of candidates established in the coalition
agreement. Finally, the effect of the age of democracy is also studied here given that the
level of party and electoral instability is often seen as a characteristic of the early years of
democratic regimes (Kitschelt et al., 1999).
Table 5: Correlation between party change and vote share, age of democracy and closed-list
system
Vote share Age of democracy Closed-list PR
Split 0.25 -0.06 0.09
Merger -0.10 -0.09 -0.16
Exit -0.18 -0.11 0.27
Exit label change -0.15 -0.08 0.24
Entry -0.19 -0.15 0.19
Entry label change -0.19 -0.05 0.32
Pearson correlation coefficents for vote share and the age of democracy and
tetrachoric correlation coefficients for closed-list PR.
Table 5 shows that explanations of splits stand out in comparison to other forms of
change. According to this simple correlation analysis, larger parties are more likely to split
while entries, exits and mergers are more a characteristic of smaller parties. The strong
relationship between party size and splits is an important finding that needs to be explored
in greater detail in the future. It is possible that the voters of the parent party are more
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susceptible to the appeals of splinter parties, thus creating greater incentives for factions or
individual politicians to found new parties. Moreover, in contrast to other forms of change,
splits are only weakly associated with the age of democracy or closed-list electoral system.
A comprehensive explanation of splits thus clearly needs to include many other factors not
considered here, such as internal internal policy disagreements.
In line with the findings of the moderate or strong association between intra-coalitional
conflict and cooperation and new inter-party cooperation, we find that these forms of change
are more likely when party’s electoral support is low. This finding is not surprising given
that coalescing with other parties is often a matter of electoral survival for small parties. The
frequency of entries, exits and mergers also decreases somewhat as the democracy matures.
However, while entries and exits are more likely under closed-list PR system, this electoral
system is associated with the lower probability of the consolidation of coalitions through
mergers. This supports the arguments in the literature that entry into coalitions is more
likely under the closed-list system. An extension of this logic may also explain the effect
of this factor on exits and mergers. Specifically, since under closed-list system the costs of
founding new coalitions are lower, it is also less costly to dissolve an existing coalition by
switching to a new alliance. In contrast, under open- or flexible-list system, while coalitions
are less likely, once they are established, they are likely to be more durable and lead to
full-fledged mergers. This factor may therefore may account for the lack of strong positive
correlation between exits and mergers.
Country-specific patterns reported in Figure 3 tentatively support these speculations
about the causes of intra-coalitional conflict and cooperation and new inter-party coopera-
tion. A substantial variation in the frequency of these changes across time notwithstanding,
their amount decreased in most countries since the 1990s. This trend is strongest in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, which, at least in the 2000s, were charac-
terized by relatively limited party fragmentation, fewer new successful parties and greater
electoral viability of established parties. Larger and more viable parties could benefit less
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Figure 3: Intra-party, intra-coalitional and inter-party conflict and cooperation in Central
and Eastern Europe
Note: the figure reports, for each electoral term, the share of parties that experienced four
forms of change from the total number of parties in that term. The data for entry and
exit label changes are not reported given their high correlation with entry to and exit from
coalitions.
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from inter-party cooperation, leading to fewer party electoral coalitions and also fewer oppor-
tunities for exits from them or their consolidation through mergers. The remaining countries
in the region were characterized by relatively high levels of entry since their democratization.
However, in the countries with closed-list electoral institutions - especially Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania - these coalitions were less stable as shown by high frequency of exits and only
few mergers in them. The countries with open- or flexible-list systems, in particular Estonia,
Latvia and Poland, by contrast had more coalitions turned into mergers.
Figure 3 provides fewer insights about party splits. The variation in their frequency
at the country level is limited. The trend of the decrease in time is also largely absent,
possibly because the increase in party size created greater incentives for splits but this effect
could have been countervailed by the increase in party institutionalization and ideological
structuration. The lack of clear patterns in the frequency of splits further supports the notion
that intra-party conflict is a development that is largely independent from intra-coalitional
and inter-party cooperation and conflict.
Conclusion
The third wave of democracy resulted in many countries in highly unstable parties and
party systems. Not only have the levels of new party entry and exit been high, but the
same applies for change in political parties resulting from splits, mergers, and the formation
and dissolution of alliances. Indeed, the level of change as been so high as to make sys-
tematic comparisons between new and older Western democracies with stable parties and
party systems difficult (Mair, 1997). Levels of party change in Central and Eastern Europe
have decreased, but are still relatively high even twenty years after democratization. Party
instability may have become a permanent feature of the politics in these countries that may
also be a beacon of the future of party competition in older democracies (Deegan-Krause
and Haughton, 2014).
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This article makes advances our understanding of party change through a systematic
analysis of its less researched forms - splits, mergers and electoral coalitions. It conceptualizes
these forms of party change as manifestations of political conflict and cooperation within
political parties, electoral alliances and the party system. Using a new dataset on party
change in 11 Central and Eastern European countries, we find that intra-party conflict
(manifested in party splits) occurs largely independently from other forms of change. The
relationship between intra-coalition conflict (exits from alliances) and cooperation (mergers)
and the formation of new alliances is moderately strong, especially when the unit of analysis
is an individual party rather than a party-in-electoral-term.
Our findings have important implications. They indicate that parties and electoral al-
liances, even if unstable, rather than individual politicians, are key players in post-communist
politics. Furthermore, the negative effects of party change on representation, accountability
and government stability are possibly more limited than often argued as complex transfor-
mations that involve various types of change are not very common, at least not in a single
electoral term. Finally, we suggest that aggregation of different types of change into a single
index, while useful for a general assessment of party change, is of more limited value for
understanding reasons behind instability. Instead, systematic analysis that distinguishes be-
tween conflict and cooperation at intra-party, intra-coalition and systemic levels can provide
more useful insights.
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